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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1123 
___________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TERRENCE GIBBS, a/k/a T, a/k/a Terry 
 
 
    Terrence Gibbs, 
                               Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. 2-96-cr-00593-002) 
District Court Judge:  Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 14, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 21, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Terrence Gibbs appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion for a 
sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).  Because this appeal presents no 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d 
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Gibbs was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine, bribing a public official, 
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, money laundering, and using a telephone to 
facilitate a drug felony.  At his sentencing, the District Court determined that Gibbs’ total 
offense level was 46—his base offense level was 38, and the court added two levels for 
possessing a dangerous weapon, four levels because Gibbs was the leader of a criminal 
conspiracy involving at least five participants, and two more levels for obstructing 
justice.  Because life in prison was the recommended sentence for an offense level of 46 
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), the District Court imposed 
that sentence.  We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  See United 
States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 After the adoption of Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, which reduced the 
offense levels under the Guidelines for most drug quantities, Gibbs moved for a reduction 
of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Gibbs acknowledged that the 
“Government may argue . . . by leaving all of [his] other guideline calculations 
unaffected after a [two] level reduction . . . [his] total offense level would be lowered to 
44, which [] yields the same guideline range of life imprisonment.”  Gibbs urged the 
District Court to instead subtract two levels from a total offense level of 43.  He argued 
that the sentencing table—which contains the sentencing ranges that correspond with 
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each total offense level—stops at 43 and that applying any sentence based on an offense 
level greater than 43 would be illegal under Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 
(1998) (“a maximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the 
guidelines”).  Gibbs reasoned that, applying Amendment 782 to an offense level of 43, 
his total offense level should be 41, which would result in a Guidelines range of 324 to 
405 months.   
 The District Court disagreed.  It ruled that applying Amendment 782 would reduce 
Gibbs’ base offense level by two, making it 36.  Adding the enhancements applied at the 
original sentencing, Gibbs’ total offense level would be 44.  Because the sentencing table 
requires that “an offense level of more than 43 [] be treated as an offense level of 43,” 
which carries a recommended Guidelines sentence of life in prison, the court determined 
that Amendment 782 did not lower Gibbs’ applicable sentencing range.  Accordingly, the 
District Court found no basis to reduce his sentence.  See United States v. Lindsey, 556 
F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that where a recalculation under an Amendment to 
the sentencing guidelines “leads to the same applicable [Guidelines] range, no 
modification of [the defendant’s] sentence is authorized by § 3582(c).”) (emphasis in 
original).   
 Gibbs appealed.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment if there is no substantial question 
presented on appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Generally, a district court cannot “modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 
imposed” unless a defendant is eligible for a reduction of sentence pursuant to § 3582(c).  
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Section 3582(c)(2) allows for a reduction if: (1) the sentence was “based on a sentencing 
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission;” and (2) “a 
reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); United States v. Flemming, 723 F.3d 407, 410 
(3d Cir. 2013).  A reduction in sentence is not consistent with the relevant policy 
statement unless the amendment has “the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable 
guideline range.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).  The Guidelines also provide specific 
instructions for a court when determining whether a sentence reduction is warranted.  § 
1B1.10(b)(1).  Section 1B1.10(b)(1) instructs that “the court shall determine the amended 
guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment[] . . . 
had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced[,] . . . substituting only the 
amendment[] . . . for the corresponding guideline provision[] that [was] applied” but 
“leav[ing] all other guideline application decisions unaffected.”  Id.; see also Lindsey, 
556 F.3d at 243.   
 Here, applying the two-level reduction under Amendment 782, Gibbs’ base 
offense level would be reduced from 38 to 36.  Adding the sentence enhancements the 
District Court originally applied at sentencing—two levels for possessing a dangerous 
weapon, four levels because Gibbs was the leader of a criminal conspiracy involving at 
least five participants, and two more levels for obstructing justice—Gibbs’ total offense 
level would be 44.  As the District Court ruled, an offense level of 44 must be treated as 
an offense level of 43, which corresponds to Guidelines sentence of life in prison—the 
same Guidelines sentence as Gibbs’ original Guidelines sentence.  Therefore, as the 
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District Court correctly explained, Amendment 782 did not lower Gibbs’s sentencing 
range, and no reduction in Gibbs’ sentence is authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  See 
Lindsey, 556 F.3d at 243.      
To the extent that Gibbs argues that any sentence, including apparently his original 
sentence, is illegal under Edwards, 523 U.S. at 515 (“a maximum sentence set by statute 
trumps a higher sentence set forth in the guidelines”), if it is based on an offense level 
greater than 43, that argument cannot be properly raised in a § 3582 proceeding.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3) (“proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) . . . do not 
constitute a full resentencing of the defendant.”); see also Dillon v. United States, 130 S. 
Ct. 2683, 2690-91 (2009) (§ 3582 authorizes “only a limited adjustment to an otherwise 
final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding”).  Rather, a motion under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 is the proper mechanism for challenging a federal conviction or an 
allegedly illegal sentence.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997); see 
also United States v. Carter, 500 F.3d 486, 490 (6th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing between 
motions brought under § 3582(c) and those brought under § 2255).   
 For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
